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Abstract—The conventional practice of retail electric utilities
is to aggregate customers geographically. The utility purchases
electricity for its customers via bulk transactions on the wholesale
market, and it passes these costs along to its customers, the
end consumers, through their rate plan. Typically, all residential
consumers are offered the same per unit rate plan, which leads
to cost sharing. Some consumers use their electricity at peak
hours, when it is more expensive on the wholesale market, and
others consume mostly at off peak hours, when it is cheaper, but
they all enjoy the same per unit rate through their utility. This
paper proposes a method for the utility to segment a population
of consumers on the basis of their individual consumption
patterns. An optimal recruitment algorithm is developed to
aggregate consumers into groups with a relatively low per unit
cost of electricity on the wholesale market. Enough consumers
are grouped to ensure reduced forecast error and consequently
diminish wholesale electricity costs for the aggregator. The
resulting optimal rate groups are stable in that no one consumer
can unilaterally improve her outcome.
Index Terms—Smart meter, electricity consumption, utility,
aggregation, load-serving entity
I. INTRODUCTION
ELECTRICAL retail utilities function as intermediaries be-tween the wholesale market and end consumers. Utilities
purchase in bulk for the consumers they represent and then
factor the cost of these bulk purchases into the rate plans
offered to the consumers. This middleman service provides
advantages for the system operator and the consumers. The
system operator can deal with a mass of customers through
a single agent instead of undertaking many thousands of
transactions with end consumers. The consumers are spared
the complexities of entering the wholesale market. A more
fundamental benefit of aggregating consumers is the reduction
of uncertainty in load forecasts. While the day-ahead consump-
tion of individual consumers is difficult to forecast to within
50% accuracy, the aggregate consumption of a large group
of consumers can be accurately forecasted with errors smaller
than 2% [1]–[3]. Thus, by aggregating a group of customers,
utilities can provide the system operator with higher-accuracy
forecasts of load. As a consequence, utilities face less risk in
their transactions on the wholesale market.
Traditionally, the cost of the bulk electricity is allocated
to the residential consumers using simple proportional rate
This research was supported in part by the TomKat Center for Sustainable
Energy, the Precourt Institute for Energy Efficiency, and the Thomas V. Jones
Stanford Graduate Fellowship in Science & Engineering.
plans: all customers face a single rate, and each customer’s
bill is computed by multiplying that rate by the customer’s
total usage. However, most utilities are moving away from
this simple scheme because of cost sharing among customers.
The wholesale market price varies greatly based on time of day
and geographical location.1 If all consumers face a single rate,
then those that use electricity at cheaper times or locations
are subsidizing those that use electricity at more expensive
times or locations. Enabled by advances in customer metering
(e.g. advanced metering infrastructure), utilities have started
designing rates more representative of usage.
New rates mainly take two forms: geography-based and
time-based. For example, Pacific Gas and Electric Company
(PG&E) divides northern California into zones and charges
a different rate for each zone. Customers also face time of
use (TOU) prices which charge different prices for electricity
consumed at different times of the day. However, both methods
still do not take individual consumer behaviors into account.
It is known that consumers from the same geographical area
may exhibit drastically different behaviors [4], as illustrated in
Figure 1. Also, time of use prices may lead to large changes
in customer bills since small shifts in temporal behaviors can
result in significant cost differences. Furthermore, prior work
in [5] established that residential consumers are sensitive to the
average price of electricity, more so than to the marginal price.
Therefore a constant average price is also more beneficial in
influencing customer behaviors. We investigate how an agent
can provide differing average prices for its customers.
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Fig. 1. The two curves are the mean daily usage patterns for two different
consumers in Bakersfield, California, over a period of one year. The solid
green curve is for a consumer who uses electricity mostly at times when the
price of electricty is high, whereas the dashed red curve is for a consumer
who uses electricity mostly at off-peak times. This demonstrates that two
consumers nearby each other can have very different consumption behaviors.
1For California, prices in the afternoon at the inland areas tends to be much
higher than prices at night for coastal areas.
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In this paper, we design an optimal aggregation and pricing
scheme by explicitly considering the behaviors of individual
consumers. We aggregate consumers into groups where a
single rate is charged for all consumers within a group. This
design balances the two competing desires of rate design:
limiting cost sharing and reducing uncertainty. We propose a
method to optimally segment consumers into groups for given
levels of uncertainty tolerated by the groups. Our scheme can
be used by any agent that purchases electricity for consumers
on the wholesale market, such as a utility or other load-serving
entity (LSE). For the remainder of this paper, we will use LSE
to denote any such agent.
We model the electricity market as a simple two-stage mar-
ket. At the day ahead stage, the LSE forecasts its customers’
consumption and purchases some amount of electricity [6], [7].
Any discrepancy between the amount purchased in advance
and the customers’ actual consumption is settled at the real
time price. Thus, the LSE faces risks in its wholesale market
transactions due to forecast errors and to uncertainty in the
real time price, whose value is unknown at the day ahead
stage and can spike sharply [8]. Aggregation enables the LSE
to mitigate the risk of high forecast errors.
An important application of our method is designing rate
plans in deregulated retail markets. The deregulation of the
retail electricity market has opened the possibility for LSEs
to offer a variety of rate plans for residential consumers. In
ERCOT’s geography, for example, there are over 200 plans
with a range of prices and schemes. These plans have expe-
rienced significant turnover of their customer base, which is
undesirable from the standpoint of an individual LSE [9], [10].
We show that our design method induces a stable partitioning
of the consumers, in the sense that no consumer can reduce
his cost by unilaterally moving from one group to another.
A. Our approach
We develop a fractional integer program for aggregating
groups of consumers with the lowest per unit cost of electricity,
and we present an optimal solution to this nonconvex problem.
The LSE then uses the group’s average per unit cost as the
basis for its rate. As the group size gets larger, this average
per unit cost increases, but the forecast error decreases [3].
We quantify this trade-off in our dataset of hourly smart meter
readings for over 100,000 residential consumers for one year.
We propose a method for the LSE to determine its preferred
group size and composition. The LSE can extend this method
to segment an entire population of consumers into different
groups based on their average cost to serve and a common
acceptable level of forecast error. This segmentation scheme
creates groups of consumers that are stable in the sense that
no one consumer can improve her situation unilaterally.
B. Outline
In Section II of this paper, we formalize the aggregation
problem facing the LSE. In Section III, we present an optimal
algorithm for constructing groups of consumers with a low
per unit cost of electricity. In Section IV, we calculate the
uncertainty faced by a group of consumers and demonstrate
the trade-off between rate and uncertainty. In Section V, we
show how to segment the entire population using our method.
We close with some concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider the scenario of an LSE who purchases electric-
ity on behalf of a group of residential consumers in a two-stage
wholesale market. We begin by defining the costs this LSE in-
curs for purchasing electricity. We introduce a selection vector
u ǫ {0, 1}N , where N is the size of the entire population of
consumers, and ui = 1 if the ith consumer is part of the group
of consumers for which the LSE purchases electricity. Let d(i)
denote the electricity consumption of the ith consumer on a
given day. We assume that this consumption is nonnegative
(i.e., no reverse power flow). The total consumption of the
group of consumers on the given day is
d = ΣNi=1uid
(i) (1)
The two stages of the wholesale electricity market are the
day ahead market and the real time market. At the day ahead
stage, the LSE forecasts the aggregate consumption of the
consumers for the next day, dˆ. Based on that forecast, the
LSE purchases an amount of electricity for them, d˜, at the
day ahead price, p. The cost incurred at the day ahead stage
is pT d˜. The next day, the consumers’ actual consumption, d,
is realized. The difference between what they consume and
what the LSE previously purchased is settled at the real time
price, q. We assume that p and q are nonnegative.
For the kth day, the total cost ck that the LSE pays is:
ck = p
T
k d˜k + q
T
k (dk − d˜k). (2)
Over a period of K days, the LSE will pay an average per
unit cost of electricity rK , given by:
rK =
ΣKk=1ck
ΣKk=11
Tdk
=
1
K
ΣKk=1ck
1
K
ΣKk=11
Tdk
. (3)
(Note that the rates for regulated utilities are defined in a
similar way as the average per unit cost over a period of time.)
The amount of electricity purchased at day-ahead d˜k may
be different than the forecasted consumption dˆk. For example,
the LSE may regularly decide to purchase slightly more than
the forecasted amount in order to avoid the risk of paying
a very high real time penalty. On the other hand, the real
time price and the day ahead price are typically nearly equal
in expectation [8], so the LSE needs to carefully balance
conservatism and cost.
The LSE seeks to minimize rK , which is a random vari-
able. For mathematical simplicity, instead of working with
the expectation of the entire ratio, we focus on the numer-
ator.Suppose that the LSE enters into a contract with the
consumers it is representing for a period of K days. For large
K , we can replace the numerator in the right-most fraction in
equation (3) with the expected value of ck:
rK =
K Edk [ck]
ΣK
k=11
Tdk
. (4)
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We can expand the expectation in the numerator of (4):
Edk [ck] = Edk
[
pTk d˜k + q
T
k (dk − d˜k)
]
. (5)
We can write dˆk = dk + ǫk; in other words, the forecasted
consumption is the actual consumption plus an error term, ǫk.
As discussed previously, the LSE can choose at the day ahead
stage to buy a different amount of electricity than its forecast.
Let the difference between the two be δk. Then d˜k = dˆk+δk.
We now rewrite the right hand side of (5) as:
Edk
[
pTk (dk + ǫk + δk)
]
+ Edk
[
qTk (−ǫk − δk)
]
. (6)
We apply the fact that E [xy] = Cov(x, y) + E [x]E [y] to
expand (6):
= Edk
[
pTk dk
]
+tr (Cov (pk, ǫk)) + Edk [pk]
T Edk [ǫk]
+tr (Cov (pk, δk)) + Edk [pk]
T Edk [δk]
−tr (Cov (qk, ǫk))− Edk [qk]
T Edk [ǫk]
−tr (Cov (qk, δk))− Edk [qk]
T Edk [δk]
We assume that the LSE uses an unbiased forecaster, so
E [ǫk] = 0. Furthermore, we assume that the electricity market
is an efficient market, meaning that E [pk] = E [qk]. Under
these conditions, we can simplify the above sum to:
Edk
[
pTk dk
]
+ tr (Cov (pk − qk, ǫk))+ tr (Cov (pk − qk, δk)) .
(8)
The following two sections examine how the LSE can
use this model to evaluate the per unit cost and uncertainty
involved in purchasing electricity for its customers.
III. COST-BASED AGGREGATION
We begin by outlining some simplifcations that allow us
to focus on the cost of serving an individual consumer and
groups of consumers. In this section we will assume that the
forecasting errors are independent of the difference between
the day ahead and real time price. This means that the
second term of (8), tr (Cov (pk − qk, ǫk)), equals zero. This
assumption is standard in the literature [11], [12].2
The first term in (8), Edk
[
pTk dk
]
, represents how aligned
the group’s consumption is with the day ahead price. If the
group uses most of its electricity during times when the price
is high, then that term will be large. The last term in (8),
tr (Cov (pk − qk, δk)), captures whether, on average, the LSE
saves money or loses money by purchasing something different
than what the forecaster predicts for the group’s consumption.
We will assume that the LSE is unable to make money in
this way. In this case, the LSE’s best strategy is to set δk =
0, and we are left with Edk [ck] = Edk
[
pTk dk
]
. With these
2The independence assumption may not hold generally. For example,
suppose the LSE’s forecast errors are correlated positively to the forecast
errors of all buyers on the market. Suppose on a given day that the LSE’s
forecast error is negative. We would then expect that the total amount of
electricity purchased in the market at the day ahead stage will be below the
total demand. This would drive up the real time price due to a shortage of
generation scheduled at the day ahead stage.
simplifications in place, the rate paid by the LSE per unit of
electricity is:
rK =
K Edk
[
pTk dk
]
ΣKk=11
Tdk
= λK (9)
When recruiting consumers, the LSE seeks to minimize the
rate that it will pay for their electricity. The LSE does not
know how they will consume electricity in the future, but it
can use historical data to compute an estimate of the λK it
would pay if it were serving the ith consumer:
λˆ(i) =
ΣHh=1p
T
h d
(i)
h
ΣHh=11
Td
(i)
h
, (10)
where H is the number of days of historical data available.
We assume that the consumers’ history is a good predictor of
their future behavior in terms of how aligned their electrical
consumption is with the day-ahead price.
To achieve the lowest possible rate, the LSE would choose
to recruit and serve the single consumer with the lowest value
of λˆ. This would be the consumer whose consumption is most
orthogonal to the day-ahead price vector, given the assumed
nonnegativity of consumption and price. In other words, this
consumer uses electricity mostly at off-peak hours.
This may not be a feasible recruitment plan for the LSE
for two main reasons. First, a single consumer likely will not
be a viably large basis for the LSE’s operation. Second, the
electrical consumption of an individual residential consumer is
highly variable day-to-day and subject to forecasting errors of
50% [4]. This may lead to large fluctuations in the day-to-day
per unit cost of electricity paid by the LSE.
Therefore, the LSE needs a method to recruit and aggregate
multiple consumers into a group that has a low cost to serve.
For a group specified by the selection vector u, we define the
cost to serve metric λˆu as follows,
λˆu =
ΣHh=1p
T
hdh
ΣHh=11
Tdh
, (11)
where dh is the consumption of the group on the hth day.
A. Optimal Recruitment Algorithm
Suppose the LSE wishes to recruit the M consumers who
will have the lowest cost to serve among any group of that
size. Let PH denote the concatenation of ph vectors for h =
1 to H . Similarly, D
(i)
H is the concatenation of d
(i)
h vectors.
Choosing the M best consumers to minimize λˆu is given by
the following optimization problem:
minimize
u
∑N
i=1 uiP
T
HD
(i)
H∑N
i=1 ui1
TD
(i)
H
(12a)
subject to 1Tu = M, ui ∈ {0, 1}. (12b)
Let ti = P
T
HD
(i)
H and wi = 1
TD
(i)
H . We rewrite the
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optimization as:
minimize
u
uT t
uTw
(13a)
subject to 1Tu = M, ui ∈ {0, 1}. (13b)
Finally, we introduce a slack variable λ and obtain:
minimize
u,λ
λ (14a)
subject to (t− λw)Tu ≤ 0 (14b)
1Tu = M, ui ∈ {0, 1}. (14c)
In general, the above combinatorial optimization problems,
called linear fractional programs, are difficult to solve. Because
all parameters in our problem are positive, there is an efficient
bisection algorithm for a feasibility problem which tries to find
u and λ to satisfy (14b) and (14c). This can be performed in a
greedy fashion per Algorithm 1. For a given λ, we rank each
element of the vector (t − λw) and choose the smallest M
elements with the selection vector u. If (t−λw)Tu ≤ 0, then
we have found a feasible solution for the given value of λ;
otherwise, no solution exists for this value of λ.
Algorithm 1 The LSE can use this alorithm to select the group
of M customers who had the lowest cost to serve λˆu over a
period of historical data.
1: Initialize bisection method:
2: λ← max{t1/w1, . . . , tN/wN}
3: λ← min{t1/w1, . . . , tN/wN}
4: Set γ ⊲ Convergence threshold
5: Bisection method:
6: while λ− λ > γ do
7: λ = (λ+ λ)/2 ⊲ Update current λ
8: Compute (t− λw)
9: Sort (t− λw) in ascending order to obtain{i1 . . . iN}
10: Construct uλ,i = 1 if i ∈ {i1, . . . , iM}
11: if (t− λw)T uλ ≤ 0 then ⊲ Feasibility test
12: uλ feasible
13: else
14: uλ ← ∅
15: end if
16: if uλ = ∅ then
17: λ← λ ⊲ Infeasible, increase lower bound
18: else
19: λ← λ ⊲ Feasible, decrease upper bound
20: end if
21: end while
22: Result:
23: Minimum λ
24: Associated selection vector uλ ⊲ 1
Tuλ = M
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 returns the minimum feasible value
of λ (within a tolerance of γ).
Proof. To show the bisection method applied to the feasibility
problem is optimal, we must show that a unique minimum λ
exists and that bisection will always find that λ.
First define the set of feasible values of λ as Λ = {λ : ∃ u ∈
{0, 1}N ,1Tu = M, (t− λw)T u ≤ 0}. This defines a set
of attainable servicing costs for M consumers. Therefore, the
solution to (14) is λ⋆ = inf{λ ∈ Λ}. Bisection will find λ⋆ if
the following condition holds for ǫ > 0: λ ∈ Λ =⇒ λ+ǫ ∈ Λ
and λ /∈ Λ =⇒ λ − ǫ /∈ Λ. That is, if there is a unique
transition point, then the bisection method is guaranteed to
find it.
We first prove that λ ∈ Λ =⇒ λ + ǫ ∈ Λ. If λ ∈ Λ,
then there exists uλ satisfying (t− λw)
T
uλ ≤ 0. The vector
uλ is feasible for λ + ǫ since (t − (λ + ǫ)w)Tuλ = (t −
λw)Tuλ− ǫwTuλ ≤ 0. The first term is nonpositive because
uλ is feasible for λ. The second term is always positive since
wi > 0 and ǫ > 0.
Now we prove that λ /∈ Λ =⇒ λ − ǫ /∈ Λ. If λ /∈ Λ
then ∄ uλ such that (t− λw)
T
uλ ≤ 0. However, ∃ u′ such
that (t− λw)T u′ ≤ (t− λw)T u, ∀u : u ∈ {0, 1}N and
1Tu = M . That is, u′ is a selection vector which produces
the smallest value of (t− λw)T u. We call this vector u′ a
candidate for λ. If λ is infeasible, it must be the case that the
candidate satisfies (t− λw)T u′ > 0; otherwise, λ would be
feasible. Now consider a candidate for λ − ǫ, and call it u′′.
For u′′ we can state the following:
(t− (λ− ǫ)w)Tu′′ = (t− λw)Tu′′ + ǫwTu′′ (15)
≥ (t− λw)Tu′ + ǫwTu′′ (16)
> 0 (17)
The inequality in (15) - (16) holds since u′ is a candidate for λ
and must therefore satisfy (t−λw)Tu′ ≤ (t−λw)Tu for all
u, including u′′. Since (t− (λ− ǫ)w)Tu′′ > 0, we conclude
that λ− ǫ is infeasible.
Now the LSE has a method for putting together a group
of consumers of size M who will be relatively cheap to
service, assuming all of their electricity can be purchased at
the day-ahead price. The LSE must decide how to set the
appropriate size M . A larger group will have a higher cost to
serve because it will have to include more consumers whose
consumption aligns more closely with peaks in electricity
prices. On the other hand, a larger group offers advantages
of lower forecasting errors and easier administration.
IV. AGGREGATING TO MITIGATE UNCERTAINTY
In order to analyze the effects of uncertainty on the total
cost faced by the LSE, we consider a somewhat different
market design. Suppose the LSE is unable to sell back surplus
electricity at the real time settlement. Such an arrangement
is typically captured in deviation charges and is used by
the system operator to discourage LSEs from purchasing
excessive amounts of electricity on the day ahead market
[11]. Alternatively, the operator may want LSEs to commit
to specific load profiles at the day ahead stage with a large
penalty for consuming less than they committed to. For this
market design, the total cost paid by the LSE in (2) becomes:
ck = p
T
k d˜k + q
T
k
[
dk − d˜k
]
+
, (18)
where [x]+ denotes max(x, 0).
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For a given group of consumers, the LSE chooses d˜k to
minimize Edk [ck]. At the optimal choice d˜
⋆
k, the following
first order condition must hold:
∇d˜kEdk [ck]
∣∣∣∣
d˜k=d˜
⋆
k
= 0 (19)
The day ahead price is known to the LSE when it purchases
electricity on the day ahead market, so pk is a realized random
variable at this stage. The gradient can be applied as shown:
0 = pk + Edk
[
∇d˜kq
T
k
[
dk − d˜
⋆
k
]
+
]
(20a)
= pk + Edk
[
−qTk diag(~1{dk > d˜
⋆
k})
]
, (20b)
where ~1{dk > d˜
⋆
k} is a vector whose ith element is one if the
ith element of dk is greater than that of d˜
⋆
k. Next, we assume
that the difference between dk and d˜
⋆
k is independent of the
real time price.
0 = pk − Edk [qk]
T
diag(Edk
[
~1{dk > d˜
⋆
k}
]
) (21a)
= pk − Edk [qk]
T
diag(~P{dk > d˜
⋆
k}), (21b)
where ~P{dk > d˜
⋆
k}) is a vector whose ith element is the
probability that the ith element of dk is greater than that of d˜
⋆
k.
Equation (21b) gives an easy way to compute the optimal d˜
⋆
k,
assuming the distribution of dk is known. This is a variation
on the classic newsvendor model [13], [14].
Recall that d˜
⋆
k = dk + ǫk + δ
⋆
k . Therefore, we can write
~P{dk > d˜
⋆
k} as ~P{−ǫk > δ
⋆
k}, so the optimal day ahead
purchase quantities are based on the distribution of the fore-
cast errors. If we assume that the forecast errors are jointly
Gaussian with zero mean and covariance Σ, we can write
δ⋆k = fk(Σ). Substituting the optimal electricity purchase into
(18), and taking the expectation, we arrive at:
Edk [ck] = Edk
[
pTk dk
]
+ gk(Σ) (22a)
gk(Σ) = Edk [fk(Σ)] + Edk [qk]
T Edk
[
[−ǫk − fk(Σ)]+
]
.
(22b)
Recall that (19) relates to a component of (4), so we can
substitute (22a) back into (4) to obtain:
rK =
K Edk
[
pTk dk
]
1TDK
+
ΣKk=1 gk(Σ)
1TDK
(23a)
= λK +
ΣKk=1 gk(Σ)
1TDK
. (23b)
In the next section of this paper, we will show how the first
and second terms of (23) vary with the composition and size
of the group of consumers selected by the LSE, in other words
how they vary with u and ‖u‖ 1. For now we will discuss these
relationships in general terms.
The LSE varies u by controlling whom it recruits into its
group. If the LSE recruits only consumers who use most of
their electricty at peak hours, its per unit cost of electricity will
be higher, and this is captured in λK . Furthermore, if the LSE
recruits only a very small number of consumers, it will face
larger forecast errors, which may lead to higher variation in
rK , partially through the gk(Σ) term. See [15] for a treatment
of the effect of forecast uncertainty on prices.
Thus, the LSE faces a tradeoff when assembling a group
of consumers to service. After showing some initial empirical
relationships in the data, we will propose a heuristic algorithm
for the LSE to segment the population into stable groups that
can be offered different rates based on how they consume
electricity.
V. SEGMENTING THE POPULATION
A. Data description
The data are hourly smart meter readings over a period of
one year (summer 2010 to summer 2011) for 110,000 residen-
tial customers of PG&E. In addition, we use day ahead and real
time prices published by the California Independent System
Operator (CAISO) over the same period. One limitation of
our data is that it only spans one year. We use part of the
data - the first nine months - to evaluate and segment the
consumer population, and the rest of the data to validate the
segmentation scheme. Therefore, we may be introducing a
seasonal bias into the segmentation in our simulation, but that
would readily be fixed by using data spanning an entire year
for the segmentation algorithm presented below.
B. Forecasting method
For the purposes of this paper, we use a relatively simple
forecaster. We use an ARMA model, with temperature as an
external regressor, to predict the daily total electricity usage by
the consumers, yˆ. We use a vector ARMA model, again using
temperature as an external regressor, to predict the normalized
load shape, sˆ. This is a vector whose elements are the fraction
of the daily total electricity consumed in each hour. In other
words, 1T sˆ = 1. Finally, we multiply the predicted daily total
by the predicted normalized load shape to obtain the predicted
consumption for the next day: dˆ = yˆsˆ.
C. Range of λˆ(i)
To begin with, we evaluate the range of λˆ(i) values in the
entire population. Recall that the LSE seeks to minimize the
per unit cost of electricity that it incurs on the wholesale
market. One natural way for it to do this is to choose
consumers who use electricity at off-peak times with respect
to the day ahead price, and λˆ(i) captures this alignment for
the historical consumption of the ith consumer.
Figure 2 shows how λˆ(i) increases as we go from the
cheapest consumer to the most expensive consumer in our
dataset, ranked by their λˆ(i) metric computed over the first nine
months of the year. The most expensive consumer is almost
twice as expensive as the cheapest consumer, a significant
difference. This suggests that the LSE may be able to group
together cheaper consumers and offer them a lower rate.
D. Application of optimal recruitment algorithm
As mentioned before, the LSE would likely need to aggre-
gate consumers together to service them practically. We apply
Algorithm 1 using the first nine months of data as the historical
period. Let λˆM denote the minimum value of λ achieved using
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Fig. 2. A plot of λˆ(i) vs. consumer rank, in order of increasingly expensive
consumers. The difference between the cheapest and the costliest consumer
is about 2.0 cent/kWh. The steep slopes at either end of the curve mean that
there are relatively few very cheap consumers or very expensive consumers.
The horizontal orange line is the average per unit cost for the population.
the algorithm given a group size M . Figure 3 illustrates how
λˆM varies with M . Note that at M = 39, 800, approximately
37% of the population, λˆM is within 5% of the population
average. On the other hand, λˆ500 is 2.75 cents/kWh, which is
17% lower than the population average, so the optimal group
of size 500 could be offered a meaningfully cheaper rate plan.
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Fig. 3. λˆM is increasing in M because as the group size increases, the
algorithm includes consumers who are more and more aligned with the day
ahead price vector. The horizontal dashed line is λˆM whenM is the size of the
entire population. In other words, it is the average per unit cost of electricity
for servicing the entire population at the day ahead price. Randomly selected
groups of consumers have a λˆ close to this population average.
The LSE now knows how its per unit cost of electricity will
change based on how large of a group of low-cost consumers it
recruits. Practical operational considerations may set a lower
limit on group size, but the LSE needs a way to determine
how big of a group it should aggregate, in other words, how
to select M . We propose that the LSE take into account how
group size affects its forecasting error.
The larger the group, the more accurately its aggregate
consumption can be forecasted. To demonstrate this result in
the data, we use the forecaster described previously to predict
hourly group consumption for the last three months of the
year. We do this for two types of groups - groups constructed
by randomly assembling individuals, and groups constructed
using the optimal recruitment algorithm. The error metric we
use is the coefficient of variation, CV , which is commonly
used in forecasting literature as a measure of performance.
Let d(t) be the actual consumption of the group of consumers
at time t, and let dˆ(t) be the forecasted consumption for the
same period. Then
CV = 100
√
1
T
ΣTt=1
(
d(t)− dˆ(t)
)2
1
T
ΣTt=1d(t)
(%). (24)
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of group size on forecast error.
For both the random groups and optimal groups, the coefficient
of variation of the forecast error decreases with group size. The
decrease for random groups is smooth and monotone, while
the curve for the optimal groups exhibits more complicated
behavior. If the error curve for optimal groups coincided with
that of the random groups, we could assert that CV , and by
extension Σ, is a function solely of group size - but that is
not the case. It is clearly a function of both u and ‖u‖1, both
composition and size.
The CV is related to the variability in electricity costs faced
by the LSE [15]. If the CV is high, and if the day ahead and
real time prices tend to be different, the LSE can expect a
higher variation in its per unit cost of electricity from one day
to the next because the higher forecast errors will require it to
purchase (or sell) more electricity at the real time settlement.
10 100 1000 10000
5
20
10
0
M
CV
Optimal Groups
Random groups, mean
Random groups, 95% conf.
Fig. 4. CV is decreasing inM because the consumption of larger groups can
be forecasted more accurately. The black line is the mean CV for randomly
constructed groups, and the dashed lines are the 95% confidence interval. The
blue line is for groups constructed using the optimal recruitment algorithm.
Until about M = 1000, the optimal groups have higher forecasting errors
than the random groups.
Therefore, if the LSE wants to control the variation in its
per unit cost of electricity, it must aggregate a certain number
of consumers together. The LSE faces a trade-off - a smaller
group size allows for a lower per unit cost, while a larger group
size allows for a lower variation in per unit cost. Suppose the
LSE sets an upper limit CV on the forecast error as a way of
controlling the variation in its costs. Then it should determine
the minimum group size M such that the CV for optimal
groups of that size is less than or equal to CV . Finally, it
should run the optimal recruitment algorithm to choose the
lowest-cost group of consumers of size M . Now the LSE
knows which consumers to recruit to get a group that will
have a low per unit cost of electricity and an adequately small
variation in that cost. For example, if the LSE set a limit of
CV = 10%, it would find on Figure 4 that it needs to recruit
a group of size M = 209. It would then run Algorithm 1 with
M = 209 and obtain the selection vector u that would identify
the consumers it should recruit to the group. The LSE would
then refer to Figure 3 to determine that the long run average
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per unit cost for this group will be 2.70 cents per kWh, and
it can offer a rate plan to this group based on that cost.
E. Segmenting the entire population
We now turn to how the LSE could use the methods we’ve
presented to serve an entire population. The LSE is interested
in designing stable rate schemes, in which customers do not
have an incentive to jump frequently from one to another.
This consideration is relevant to current practice - load serving
entities in ERCOT have reported substantial customer turnover,
which is undesirable [9], [10]. In our method, the LSE will
segment the population into groups that have different long
run rates but similar levels of variation in daily cost.
The LSE starts by considering the entire population and
establishing an accepted level of variation, CV . It generates a
forecast error curve similar to that for the optimal groups in
Figure 4, and it selects the smallest group size M1 such that
the CV for that group is less than or equal to CV . There is
an optimal group of low-cost consumers u1 corresponding to
this group size M1. The LSE takes this group of consumers
and serves it as an aggregate, offering them a rate plan based
on their group cost λˆM
1
.
After removing that first set of consumers from the pop-
ulation, the LSE repeats this process on the remaining con-
sumers, with the same CV limit, until the entire population
is segmented into groups. Say that the process results in P
total groups. These groups, u1, u2, ..., uP , will be of various
sizes. Each subsequent group will be offered a higher rate
than the preceding group because the lowest-cost consumers
have already been assigned to prior groups. In other words,
λˆM
i
≤ λˆM
i+1
. However, by construction, every group will
have the same level of risk, CV .
Returning to our previous example, if the LSE sets CV =
10, the first group of consumers it recruits will be of size
M1 = 209, and it will offer that group a rate plan based
on an average per unit cost of λˆM
1
= 2.70 cents per kWh.
The LSE then removes this group of consumers from the
population. Figure 5 illustrates the next iteration of the LSE’s
segmentation process. The LSE again applies the CV = 10
threshold and chooses to go with a group of size M2 = 145,
as seen in the top panel. The LSE recruits these consumers
into a group and offers them a rate plan based on its average
per unit cost of λˆM
2
= 2.81 cents per kWh, as illustrated in
the bottom panel. The LSE would repeat this process until
all consumers had been assigned into a group. Note that
it is possible that on the last iteration, the CV curve for
the remaining consumers will be entirely above CV . In that
case, the LSE must aggregate together all of the remaining
consumers, and this last group will have a forecast error higher
than the other groups. Alternatively, the LSE can decide not
to serve the remaining consumers, or to segment them on the
basis of a new, higher CV threshold.
Proposition 1. This method produces stable pricing plans in
the following sense: assuming that all consumers agree to the
variation limit CV , and given the initial segmentation of the
population by the LSE, no single consumer can unilaterally
take an action that would improve her outcome.
Proof. Suppose that a consumer has been assigned to group ui
and offered that group’s average rate, λˆM
i
. The consumer has
no incentive to join the group ui+1 because that group pays a
higher rate. The consumer would like to join the group ui−1
to enjoy their lower rate. However, the existing consumers in
group ui−1 will not agree to this because they already have
enough consumers in their group to reduce their risk level to
CV . Adding this new consumer will only lead to an increase in
their rate because we know that the optimal selection algorithm
did not choose this consumer to be part of ui−1.
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Fig. 5. These two figures illustrate the next step in the segmentation process
when using CV = 10 as the limit. The LSE faces a new curve for CV
vs. group size M . The LSE applies the CV = 10 threshold to the forecast
error curve, determines the required group size, and then reads off their group
per unit cost from the bottom figure. The red arrows trace out that process.
Note that the starting point for the optimal group λˆM is noticeably higher
than it was for the entire population in Fig. 3. This makes sense given that
the cheapest consumers were already recruited into the first group, so the
remaining consumers will have higher per unit costs. The orange dashed line
on the λˆM plot is the per unit cost for servicing the entire population, the
same value as in Fig. 3.
We simulate this pricing design scheme on the entire popu-
lation of consumers in our dataset, using CV = 6, 5.5, and 5.
We evaluate the daily per unit cost of electricity that the LSE
would incur for servicing each group. Figure 6 illustrates the
results of our simulation. As expected, when using the higher
forecast error threshold, the LSE segments the population into
smaller groups. For all three cases, the groups segmented out
earlier incur costs noticeably lower than the social average
cost, whereas the groups formed later incur higher costs.
For CV = 6, the LSE segments the population into 70
groups. The first 69 all satisfy the forecast error threshold
and have per unit costs ranging from λˆM
1
= 2.87 to
λˆM
69
= 3.29 cents per kWh. The average size of these groups
is 738 consumers. All of these groups, covering almost 51,000
consumers, have a per unit cost lower than the population
average. The 70th group lumps together the remaining 57,000
consumers, with a per unit cost of λˆM
70
= 3.40, which is
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Fig. 6. These figures illustrate the results of segmenting the entire population
of consumers using three different values of the CV threshold. The first figure
shows how the optimal group size M
i
varies as the segmentation proceeds.
The CV = 6 segmentation proceeds with smaller group sizes because
it doesn’t require aggregating as many consumers together to achieve that
forecast error threshold. In each of the three cases, the last and largest group
is well over 50,000 people. These last groups did not achieve the required CV
threshold. The second figure shows the per unit costs for servicing each of the
groups. The orange dashed line is the per unit cost for the entire population,
a reference point for this segmentation. As expected, in each case, the first
groups have per unit costs below the population average, and the later groups
approach and then exceed that average.
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Fig. 7. The three curves are the average daily aggregate load shapes for three
groups created by the segmentation algorithm using CV = 6. The dashed
red curve is for the second group segmented out. Its consumption is mostly
off peak, and its per unit cost to serve is 2.90 cents/kWh. The dotted blue
curve is for the 22nd group segmented out, with per unit cost to serve of
3.10 cents/kWh. The solid green curve is for the 64th group segmented out.
Its consumption is mostly on peak, and its per unit cost to serve is 3.25
cents/kWh.
above the population average. This last group has a forecast
error of CV = 7.9, exceeding the CV = 6 threshold.
For comparison, when using CV = 5, the first 13 groups
satisfy the forecast error threshold and have costs ranging from
2.90 to 3.20 cents per kWh. The average size of these groups
is 1892 consumers, and in total, they include about 25,000
consumers. The remaining 83,000 consumers are placed into
the last group, with a per unit cost of 3.36 cents per kWh,
which is above the population average, and a forecast error of
CV = 7.1, well above the threshold.
Figure 7 shows the average daily aggregate load shapes for
three groups (i = 2, 22, 64) from the segmentation performed
with CV = 6. The groups have distinct consumption patterns,
reflected in their differing per unit costs. This demonstrates
the effectiveness of the segmentation algorithm.
VI. CONCLUSION
We developed and proposed a method for an LSE to
segment a population of electricity consumers on the basis of
their average per unit cost. Using their historical consumption
patterns, the LSE identifies and aggregates consumers who
are cheaper to serve. The LSE aggregates enough consumers
to reduce the forecast error to an acceptable level, which is
common across all consumer groups. We quantified the trade-
offs involved in this process when segmenting a population
of over 100,000 PG&E residential consumers. Our simulation
demonstrated that the LSE can offer each group a different
average per unit rate plan that is based on the extent to which
they consume their electricity at peak times.
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